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# 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|ECON3050 Example of a Model Applied to the Baltic Cod Fishery

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## 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Example of a Model Applied to the Baltic Cod Fishery

Kronbak and Lindroos (2007) present the case of the Baltic cod fishery. They apply an age-structured biological model for the cod fishery, assuming that three countries simultaneously exploit the resource. The bioeconomic model in their paper is slightly different from the simple standard Gordon-Schaefer model presented in previous sections. It does, however, not change the insights of the coalition model and the characteristic function. The objective function for the players is their net present values of instantaneous profit over 50 years with the limitation of assuming the same fishing strategy for all 50 years (an open-loop control). The countries aim to maximize their net present value of profits under the open-loop control, where countries’ strategies are defined in terms of fishing mortality. The players are assumed to have quadratic cost functions but with different cost parameters. The difference in the cost parameters creates asymmetry among the players and due to the quadratic structure of the cost function the application of the equi-marginal principle is necessary. Table 5.4 presents the characteristic function and the normalized characteristic function obtained.
The Grand Coalition provides the economic efficient outcome (here defined as the maximal possible benefits). This has by default to be the case since the Grand Coalition can adopt any possible strategy and therefore also the strategy of a smaller coalition if this should prove beneficial. Hence, the Grand Coalition has the highest value for the characteristic function (the largest number in column 3). The characteristic function of any smaller coalition is between zero and the value of the Grand Coalition. Column 5 in Table 5.4 presents the normalized free-rider values of the players. The values are the normalized payoffs, relatively to the Grand Coalition, when a player acts as a singleton and the other two players form a two-player coalition.

## 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Policy Implications

This chapter shows the complications of having more than two players in a game and still aiming towards an agreement with cooperative exploitation of a resource. As the chapter highlights, it is not straightforward to find a fair way of dividing the benefits. Furthermore, there is a high risk of having strong free riding incentives which easily makes agreements unstable. Hence when it is seen in the world of policy that IFAs are inherently fragile, it is important not to neglect the conditions that are underlying the stability of the agreement. To economists the crucial foundation of the agreements is the Nash’s individual rationality constraint. This constraint says that a party will only join the IFA if he/she achieves at least the benefits that could have been obtained without the IFA. To economists this constraint may seem obvious since it is based on rationality. To policymakers it may seem less obvious since the common good may have higher priority. The rational behaviour does imply that side payments may be necessary to obtain the common good of an IFA. Side payments should be considered as a mean towards the goal. At a first glance, side payments may seem “immoral” to policymakers, but they should rather be regarded as a way to broaden the scope for bargaining, and thereby enhancing the prospects for long-term stability of the IFA. The tools provided in this chapter are different perspectives on how to determine the actual side payments. The chapter has been concerned with how to find a vector to describe how to share the benefits of IFAs, where players have an incentive to remain in the binding agreement. The rules, besides their mathematical expressions, have underlying intuitions which can be useful for policymakers, who should pay particular attention to three things: (1) Players remain sovereign and hence the risk of non-cooperation must be taken seriously. (2) Is there an excess payoff large enough from cooperation to make a binding agreement? And (3) Are side payments (or other types of transfers) needed to stabilize the agreements?

The chapter has not dealt with alternative threats or punishments if players do not comply with an agreement. Such elements could include a non-cooperative behaviour from the other players or governmental fines.

# 博弈论代写

## 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Example of a Model Applied to the Baltic Cod Fishery

Kronbak 和 Lindroos（2007 年）介绍了波罗的海鳕鱼渔业的案例。他们为鳕鱼渔业应用了一个年龄结构的生物学模型，假设三个国家同时开发该资源。他们论文中的生物经济学模型与前几节中介绍的简单标准 Gordon-Schaefer 模型略有不同。然而，它并没有改变联盟模型和特征函数的见解。参与者的目标函数是他们 50 年瞬时利润的净现值，限制条件是假设所有 50 年都采用相同的捕鱼策略（开环控制）。这些国家的目标是在开环控制下最大化其利润的净现值，其中国家的战略是根据捕捞死亡率来定义的。假设参与者具有二次成本函数但具有不同的成本参数。成本参数的差异在参与者之间造成不对称，并且由于成本函数的二次结构，有必要应用等边际原则。表 5.4 给出了特征函数和获得的归一化特征函数。

## 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Policy Implications

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## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。