Posted on Categories:Game theory , 博弈论, 经济代写

# 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Hawk-Dove-Retaliator Game

## avatest™帮您通过考试

avatest™的各个学科专家已帮了学生顺利通过达上千场考试。我们保证您快速准时完成各时长和类型的考试，包括in class、take home、online、proctor。写手整理各样的资源来或按照您学校的资料教您，创造模拟试题，提供所有的问题例子，以保证您在真实考试中取得的通过率是85%以上。如果您有即将到来的每周、季考、期中或期末考试，我们都能帮助您！

•最快12小时交付

•200+ 英语母语导师

•70分以下全额退款

## 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Hawk-Dove-Retaliator Game

The problem is already apparent in the Hawk-Dove-Retaliator Game with which Maynard Smith and Price originally explored the evolution of cooperation. A retaliator plays like a hawk against a hawk, and like a dove against a dove. The retaliate strategy is weakly dominated, and so the game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which retaliate is not played at all. As in the Hawk-Dove game, dove is played with probability $1 / 3$ and hawk with probability $2 / 3$. In the upper triangle of Figure 32 , this mixed equilibrium is marked with the letter $M$. There are also an infinity of Nash equilibria in which hawk is not played at all, marked in Figure 32 with the letter $N$. These require that retaliate is played with probability at least $3 / 5$.

The upper triangle shows the replicator dynamics for the Hawk-Dove-Retaliator Game. The shaded set is the basin of attraction for the set $N$. Maynard Smith and Price ignore this set because only $M$ is an ESS. However, if the system found its way into $N$, its only chance of escaping is if a new hawk mutation appears while it is close to $Q$. But this rare event might be delayed for a very long time. There have, in fact, been enormously long perods of stasis in the evolution of many species that might be attributed to this cause.
The lower triangle of Figure 32 shows the replicator dynamics for a modified version of the Hawk-Dove-Replicator Game in which a retaliator is realistically assumed to do a little better against a dove and a little worse against a hawk. This game has three symmetric Nash equilibria. There is an analogue of the mixed equilibrium $M$ of the Hawk-Dove Game; a pure equilibrium $R$ in which only retaliate gets played; and an equilibrium $P$ in which all three strategies are played with positive probability. The equilibria $M$ and $R$ correspond to ESS strategies.
The basin of attraction of $R$ is shaded in Figure 32. Since this is a large set, we have a toy model in which it makes sense to apply the ESS concept, and which offers the beginnings of an explanation of the evolution of cooperation. Maynard Smith and Price expand the model by introducing a bullying type who displays like a retaliator but backs down when challenged. The bullies displace doves, but otherwise nothing much changes.
However, the most interesting application of the Hawk-Dove-Replicator Game is to the case of local interaction. In real life, animals mostly play games with their geographical neighbours. Chance might therefore easily fix it so that a mutant retaliator becomes numerous in a small neighbourhood. The Hawk-Dove-Replicator Game then tells us that the other strategies will gradually be extinguished in that neighbourhood. But then the same will happen in overlapping neighbourhoods until the whole environment is taken over by retaliators.
This seems to me the most convincing toy explanation of the evolution of cooperation that is commonly offered.

## 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Social or cultural evolution

It is sometimes thought that one should only speak of evolution if the analogy with biological evolution is very close. It is true that replicators don’t only arise in a biological context.
Rules-of-thumb, codes-of-conduct, fashions, lifestyles, creeds, and scientific ideas are all replicators of a kind. Richard Dawkins refers to such cultural replicators as memes. They spread from one human mind to another through imitation or education.
I used to be enthusiastic about memes, but now that we understand that the replicator dynamics emerge not just from toy models of biological reproduction, but also from toy models of imitation and stimulus-response learning, it seems unnecessary to shackle ourselves to the meme paradigm. Whenever adaptive dynamics take us to the Nash equilibrium of a game, $\mathrm{I}$ am ready to speak of cultural evolution.
The chief difference in applying evolutionary ideas between the biological and the social sciences would seem to be that biologists are usually very well informed about the sources of interesting variation, whereas social scientists can only guess. For example, an evolutionary model in economics must take account of the fact that mutations in the form of new money-making schemes are appearing all the time, but if economists could predict which of these were going to be successful, they would all be rich!

# 博弈论代写

## 经济代写|博弈论代考Game theory代写|Social or cultural evolution

avatest.org 为您提供可靠及专业的论文代写服务以便帮助您完成您学术上的需求，让您重新掌握您的人生。我们将尽力给您提供完美的论文，并且保证质量以及准时交稿。除了承诺的奉献精神，我们的专业写手、研究人员和校对员都经过非常严格的招聘流程。所有写手都必须证明自己的分析和沟通能力以及英文水平，并通过由我们的资深研究人员和校对员组织的面试。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。